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“[phone beeps]  
[gasps] ‘Two stars?! Two stars?’  
‘Wasn't a meaningful encounter’” 
--NOSEDIVE, BLACK MIRROR SEASON 3, EP. 1 
1. Introduction 
Screenwriters1 and novelists2 have already explored the dystopian prospects of a society 
where human interactions are constantly submitted to ratings. This is inspired by the growing 
presence in our daily lives of the possibility of rating work performances, mostly through the 
well-known system of 1-5 “stars”. This practice is particularly widespread in the gig-
economy, with the case of Uber being the most visible example3. In the words of the well-
known UK Aslam and Ferrar v Uber case4, this “amounts to a performance 
management/disciplinary procedure”, as customer ratings are directly used by the platform 
to decide upon the relationship with the given driver, up to the deactivation of his or her 
account. However, the use made by Uber of customer’s ratings has also been described as a 
vehicle for workplace discrimination, in light of the high potential for biases to creep into 
evaluations for drivers.5  
                                                
* Ph.D., Postdoctoral researcher at Université Catholique de Louvain and Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles 
(Belgium). 
† Ph.D., Assistant Professor at Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) (Austria). 
‡ Ph.D., Postdoctoral researcher at Hasselt University, Lecturer at Université de Liège and Université Libre de 
Bruxelles (Belgium). 
1 Shteyngart, Super Sad True Love Story, Random House, 2010. 
2 Brooker, Nosedive, Black Mirror, Season 3 Episode 1, 21 October 2016. 
3 Dzieza, “The Rating Game”, The Verge, 28 October 2015, available at  
https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/28/9625968/rating-system-on-demand-economy-uber-olive-garden . 
4 Aslam, Farrar and Others v. Uber [2017] IRLR 4 (ET). 
5 Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, and Hwang, Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings as Vehicles for 
Workplace Discrimination (2017), 9 Policy and Internet 3, p. 256-279. 
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Far from being inextricably intertwined with the specific nature of work on demand via app, 
the phenomenon has a high potential of spilling-over in other sectors, and notably to those 
characterised by customer-facing employees, from call centres to restaurants6. In fact, in our 
own work experience we are directly confronted with students’ evaluations, which rate our 
performance as teachers. These evaluations, we are told, are relevant for the renewal of 
teaching contracts, promotions or future applications, although studies have highlighted the 
potential biases of these evaluations too.7 
The growing presence of customer ratings is part of the trend towards the “scored society” 
described by Pasquale and Citron8, and shares many of the risks highlighted by both 
computer and social sciences9. We argue that the use of customer ratings in employment-
related decision represents a lesser and less refined version of more complex techniques of 
algorithmic management and/or big data application in the employment context.10  Hence, 
the use of customer ratings in employment decisions risks producing discriminatory 
outcomes, by exacerbating biases existing in society11 and “reproducing many of the same 
troubling dynamics that have allowed discrimination to persist in society”.12 What is more, 
the use of ratings in decisions related to employment provides an easy way to “launder” 
discrimination, by deploying an instrument which appears as neutral13. In this perspective, 
the use of customer ratings to evaluate worker performance and employment opportunities 
is indeed worrisome. 
Studies on the gig economy already proved that it is not free from discriminatory practices14. 
However, taking Uber as a particularly visible case study, no specific data is available to 
correlate ratings and protected grounds, although Uber seems to collect, at least in the US 
market, data related to the background of its drivers.15 However, we argue, the potential of 
this kind of ratings to reflect biases and prejudices held (even implicitly) by customers can be 
inferred by looking at comparable effects in other areas. Indeed, biases have been found to 
shape customer behaviours in online marketplaces, resulting in lower offer prices and 
decreased response rates16. Furthermore, past studies have shown disparities in the tipping 
habits of taxi customers, highlighting how customers are consistently more likely to leave 
                                                
6 Liu, “A new job search app allows restaurant employees and employers to rate each other”, The Star, 23 
October 2017, available at https://www.thestar.com/life/food_wine/2017/10/28/a-new-job-search-app-allows-
restaurant-employees-and-employers-to-rate-each-other.html .  
7 MacNell, Driscoll and Hunt, “What’s in a Name: Exposing Gender Bias in Student Ratings of Teaching” (2015), 
Innovative Higher Education, 40, p. 291. 
8 Citron and Pasquale, “The Scored Society”, 89 Washington Law Review 1, 2014. 
9 Pope and Sydnor, “Implementing Anti-Discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models”, 3 American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3, 2011, 206; O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction, Penguin Random House, 2016. 
10 Lee et al., “Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data Driven Management on Human 
Workers”, Proc. 33rd Association for Computing Machinery Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2015, p. 
1612; Musiani, “Governance by Algorithms”, 2 Internet Policy Review, 2013. 
11 Zarsky, “Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society”, 89 Washington Law Review 1, 2014, p. 1393 
12 Barocas & Selbst, "Big Data's Disparate Impact" 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 2016, p. 732. 
13 Ibidem, p. 1382; Pasquale, The Black Box Society, Harvard University Press, 2015, p. 41. 
14 Edelman et al., “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2016; McAfee & Brynjolfsson, Machine Platform, Crowd, p. 202-203.  
15 Vaccaro, MIT Professor Working With Uber to Address Racial Bias, Boston Globe, 15 February 2017, 
available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/02/15/mit-professor-working-withuber-address-
racial-bias/MMCyaxlBTofPPVr7gojXOI/story.html. 
16 See Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, and Hwang, supra note 5, p. 8-10. 
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lower tips to drivers of minority background17. As Uber has long discouraged tipping18, the 
rating given to the driver can be seen as a proxy for tipping and, as such, seems exposed to 
the very same kind of behaviour. Thus, we will proceed on the assumption that a similar 
argument can be made for other sectors exposed to the practice of customer’s ratings. 
As it was highlighted by Sunstein, “in a competitive market that contains private racism and 
sexism, then, the existence of third-party pressures can create significant spheres of 
discrimination”19, so that bending to the discriminatory preferences of customers might be a 
rational strategy20 and, as such, impossible to correct without the intervention of regulation. 
In this sense, we agree with AG Maduro that “market alone will not cure discrimination”21. 
Therefore, a specific attention to the risks posed by the use of customer’s ratings in 
employment relations seems warranted, one that would notably consider the fitness for 
purpose of non-discrimination law in light of these developments.  
These findings have inspired the topic of the present paper. Our analysis focuses on the 
potential discriminatory effects of the use of customer ratings in employment-related 
decision. In this perspective, we propose a legal analysis of this phenomenon grounded in 
EU non-discrimination law. To do so, we draw from the recent case law concerning a 
seemingly disconnected subject, notably discrimination at the workplace on the ground of 
religion. Interestingly, the Court of Justice has ruled in this context that “the willingness of 
the employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer” cannot constitute a 
“genuine and determining occupational requirement” capable of justifying a discriminatory 
practice.22 Hence, we propose an analogy between practices adopted by an employer to 
satisfy its customers’ preferences and choices grounded on biased customer ratings. To do 
so, we first consider the applicability of EU anti-discrimination law to such a situation, then 
(Section 3) we turn to the interrelated issues stemming from data protection law. Finally 
(Section 4) we assess the obstacles and potential outcome of such a challenge, and we 
propose alternative pathways to limit the potential for discrimination of the use of customer 
ratings in employment-related decisions. 
2. Discrimination and customers’ wishes 
We now engage with the question to what extent EU equality law is fit to protect workers 
who have been discriminated because their employer relies for a work-related decision on 
ratings given by customers who have experienced the service of the respective worker. In 
                                                
17 Ayres et al., “To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping”, 114 Yale Law Journal, 2005. 
18 Rosenblat & Stark, “Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers”, 
International Journal of Communication 10, 2016, 3758–3784, p. 3775. 
19 Sunstein, “Why markets don’t stop discrimination”, in Sunstein (ed.), Free markets and social justice, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p. 153. 
20 Ibidem, p. 154: “Suppose that society includes a number of traders who want to interact with blacks or women 
as well as a number of traders who do not. Suppose, too, that it is difficult for traders who are themselves 
indifferent to race and sex distinctions to tell which traders are discriminators (a frequent phenomenon in 
competitive markets). If these conditions are met, discrimination is likely to be a rational strategy for traders. New 
companies will do poorly if they refuse to discriminate. All this suggests that markets will frequently have great difficulty 
in breaking down discrimination, if discriminatory tastes are even somewhat widespread” (emphasis added). 
21 Opinion of AG Maduro in Feryn (C-54/07), para. 18. 
22 Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui ECLI:EU:C:2017:204, para. 40. 
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many service sectors, employers rely on customer-experiences to rate the performance of 
their (self-) employed workers. As we saw, the most visible example is constituted by Uber, 
which allows its customers to rate drivers based on the routes they take, for slow traffic, or 
for refusing to speed.23 However, ratings could also be based on, or related to, other criteria, 
such as sex, age, or race and religion. Current EU equality law – as employment law in 
general – rests upon the historically developed binary divide between workers and self-
employed. Atypical workers, amongst which platform workers, do not always fit easily within 
either the established worker or self-employed concepts. So, what is the relevance of EU 
equality laws which are mostly anchored to workers?24 This question, which touches upon 
the personal scope of employment and equality law, is even more relevant since businesses 
increasingly rely on customer ratings to decide on who may continue to work for an online 
platform or not. Given that customer-ratings may have wide-ranging implications for an 
individual where a business (heavily) relies on them, there is no compelling reason to reserve 
protection resulting from the application of the non-discrimination/equal treatment principle 
to a selected group of privileged workers, to the exclusion of self-employed workers.25 
Workers, independent or not, are equally exposed to the biases of their customers. 
Where an employer relies on its customers to judge the quality of the service provided by his 
workers, the question arises as to what extent an employer can be held liable for using its 
customer’s rating. Is the customers view attributable to an employer in such a case? Usually, 
customer ratings are process through mobile applications or other web-based tools, using 
specifically designed algorithms. An algorithm can be described as “a formally specified 
sequence of logical operations that provides step-by-step instructions for computers to act 
on data and thus automate decisions”.26 The ‘behaviour’ of a digital platform is specified by 
decisions taken at various levels in the company. Therefore, an algorithm may be designed to 
take into account requirements defined by the company’s customers or any other stakeholder 
in or outside the company. In the end, there is always a conscious (human) decision that 
feeds into the algorithm (including its design) and the data model the algorithm will use to 
solve a particular problem. Algorithms play an important role not only in identifying useful 
patterns in datasets, but also in making decisions that rely on these patterns.27 
There is a widespread, though erroneous, belief that algorithms are free of subconscious 
biases.28 Mittelstadt et al. highlight the fact that operational parameters are specified by 
software engineers and “configured by users with desired outcomes in mind that privilege 
                                                
23 Cherry, "People Analytics and Invisible Labour", 61 Saint Louis University Law Journal 1, 2017, p. 12 (footnote 
63). 
24 Kullmann, "Platform Work, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and EU Gender Equality Law", 34 IJCLLIR 1, 
2018, p. 3. An exception is Directive 2010/41/EU of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council 
Directive 86/613/EEC (L 180/1). 
25 Fudge, "Self-employment, Women, and Precarious Work: The Scope of Labour Protection", in Fudge & 
Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms, Hart, 2006, p. 219. 
26 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 12, p. 674. 
27 Ibid, p. 677. 
28 New York Times, "When Algorithms Discriminate" (9 July 2015); The Atlantic, "When Discrimination Is 
Baked Into Algorithms" (6 September 2015); Isaac & Dixon, "Why big-data analysis of police activity is 
inherently biased", 2017, available at http://theconversation.com/why-big-data-analysis-of-police-activity-is-
inherently-biased-72640. 
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some values and interests over others”.29 Emphasizing the fact that technology is not 
autonomous, Felix Stalder highlights the influential role of human beings in designing the 
algorithmic models applied.30 In addition, an algorithm can only be as good as the data it 
works with, that is the data model the algorithm analyses to take decisions can be biased.31 
An algorithm may therefore “result in disproportionately adverse outcomes concentrated 
within historically disadvantaged groups in ways that look a lot like discrimination”.32 
Underlining the fact that “[a]lgorithms are not immune from the fundamental problem of 
discrimination”, Frank Pasquale stresses that “negative and baseless assumptions congeal 
into prejudice”.33 
Therefore, it is the employer who has a say in how customer ratings do look like and 
whether and to what extent such ratings should feed into the worker’s performance 
feedback. By allowing customer ratings to feed into the employer’s decision-making on how 
the worker performs, even though it is perhaps the algorithm taking the ultimate decision, 
the employer externalises his right to give directions and instructions as part of the 
employment relationship. Hence, the customer becomes part of the firm, playing an active 
role in the service encounter and the worker bearing the responsibility for any failure or 
success.34 As ratings are mostly made available in relation to service jobs where customer 
satisfaction is important, customers (can) therefore play a powerful role in determining the 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.35 Consequently, customer ratings can be 
seen as “good customer service”.36 
But is the employer, according to EU equality law, liable for taking discriminatory decisions 
regarding worker performance, where he relies for his decision on a customer’s point of 
view? So far, EU case law has only cursorily dealt with the role of customers in relation to 
employment relationships. Nevertheless, there is limited EU case law where businesses rely 
on customer preferences, which shows the possible tension between business interests, i.e. 
satisfying customer needs, and the right of individuals not to be treated differently based on, 
for instance, their ethnic origin or religion. In Feryn, an employer declared “publicly that [he] 
will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin”.37 The reason the employer 
gave for not recruiting ‘immigrants’ was because its customers were reluctant to give them – 
as fitters – access to their private residences.38 As the employer’s statement is likely to 
strongly dissuade certain candidates from submitting their candidature and, consequently, to 
hinder their access to the labour market, the CJEU found that this constitutes direct 
discrimination in respect of recruitment within the meaning of Directive 2000/43/EC.39  
                                                
29 Mittelstad et al., "The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate", 3 Big Data & Society 1, 2016, p. 1. 
30 Stalder, "Algorithmen, die wir brauchen", 2017, available at https://netzpolitik.org/2017/algorithmen-die-wir-
brauchen . 
31 Barocas & Selbst, p. 680ff. 
32 Ibid, p. 673. 
33 Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, HUP, 2015, p. 38. 
34 Wang, "When the Customer is King: Employment Discirmination as Customer Service" 23 Virginia Journal of 
Social Policy & the Law 250, 2016, p. 265. 
35 Ibid, p. 250. 
36 Ibid, p. 262. 
37 Case C-54/07, Feryn, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397. 
38 Ibid, para 16. 
39 Ibid, para 25. 
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In addition, the CJEU ruled that for the assessment whether someone has been 
discriminated, it is irrelevant whether there has been an identifiable victim.40 A lack of an 
identifiable complainant cannot lead to the conclusion that there is no direct 
discrimination.41 Furthermore, in Bougnaoui, in which the customer requested the employer 
“that there should be ‘no veil next time’”, it was ruled that a customer’s preference could not 
be regarded as a genuine and determining occupational requirement justifying a 
discrimination.42 AG Sharpston emphasised that a “customer’s attitude may itself be 
indicative of prejudice based on one of the ‘prohibited factors’, such as religion”, and 
therefore “it seems […] particularly dangerous to excuse the employer from compliance with 
an equal treatment requirement in order to pander to that prejudice”.43 She further stresses 
that Directive 2000/78/EC confers protection in employment against adverse treatment 
based on one of the prohibited factors (religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, 
Art. 1). “It is not about losing one’s job in order to help the employer’s profit line.”  
From the few cases at EU level, it can be derived that a customer’s wish or preference seems 
to be irrelevant for establishing whether it was the employer who directly or indirectly 
discriminates his workers. Indeed, as AG Kokott in her opinion in the Achbita case wrote, it 
certainly may be the case that an undertaking takes, even must take, into consideration the 
wishes of third parties. Otherwise, it would be unable to sustain its presence in the market. 
Nevertheless, an undertaking cannot “pander blindly and uncritically to each and every 
demand and desire expressed by a third party”.44 Thus, it is still the employer who relies on a 
customer’s wish and by doing that has the power to discriminate a worker because of his or 
her sex, religion, or age. Based on the few cases, under EU law, the discrimination by a 
customer’s rating is attributable to the employer and compliance with EU non-discrimination 
laws can be enforced against him. 
A difficulty to establish a discriminatory decision or behaviour may exist where the customer 
rating does not criticise the worker on grounds that are protected by EU law. Existing 
directives protect individuals based on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin (2000/43/EC), 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (2000/78/EC) and sex (2006/56/EC). 
A much wider range of potential grounds on which someone can be discriminated can be 
found in Art. 21 EUCFR, referring to colour, social origin, genetic features, languages, 
political and any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, and birth. 
Relevant in relation to customer ratings through digital platforms seems to be that it still is 
the business that treats individuals differently if it relies on its customer’s prejudices or 
biases. Other than Directive 2000/78/EC and Directive 2006/54/EC, Directive 
2000/43/EC is not restricted to discrimination in situations of employment and occupation, 
including working conditions such as pay (Art. 157 TFEU) and dismissal, and has thus a 
much broader scope. 
                                                
40 Ibid, para 23. 
41 Ibid, para 25. 
42 According to the CJEU, a genuine and determining occupation requirement “cannot, however, cover subjective 
considerations, such as the willingness of the employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer” 
(para 40). 
43 Para 133. 
44 Para 90. 
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Customer ratings might, to use an example mentioned by Zarsky, be implicitly 
discriminatory, that is discrimination through masking (making discrimination undetectable, 
or defensible)45, subconscious discriminatory motivations (long learned biases) and relying 
upon tainted datasets or tools (datasets or data collection models which systematically 
discriminate, e.g. due to relying on workers’ previous achievements, overrepresented negative 
information).46 While EU law only knows two types of discrimination, the question is 
whether this concerns direct or indirect discrimination. 
An individual who thinks that he has been discriminated against, needs to establish relevant 
facts. According to the CJEU in the Feryn case, where there are facts from which it may be 
presumed that there has been discrimination, the defendant has to prove that there has been 
no violation of the principle of non-discrimination.47 Statements made by an employer that it 
will not recruit workers of a certain racial or ethnic origin are such facts. Discrimination has 
the reputation of being particularly hard to substantiate and perhaps even more so in 
employment situations. Aware of this problem, the EU legislature has adopted measures to 
assist applicants claiming to be victims of discrimination on the grounds of, for instance, sex, 
age or origin. Nevertheless, the shift in the burden of proof does not go so far as to uphold 
its complete reversal. Employers enjoy a long-standing freedom to recruit the people of their 
choice, which must not be completely disregarded.48 The shift of the burden of proof means 
that it is then for the employer to present sufficient evidence to prove that it has not 
breached the equal treatment principle, by showing, for instance, that the actual recruitment 
practices do not correspond to the statements at stake.49 
In practice, even though the burden of proof can shift to the employer, it still is, in some 
cases, difficult for an individual to establish enough facts to trigger the reversal.  
Establishing the relevant facts can be problematic, especially where this would involve 
(sensitive) information of third parties, such as other applicants or co-workers. Here, the 
Kelly case is of interest, where an unsuccessful applicant believed that his application was not 
accepted because of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment. According to the 
CJEU, the applicant is not entitled to information held by the course provider on the 
qualifications of the other applicants for the course in question, in order that he may 
establish “facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination”.50 Thus, it cannot be excluded that a refusal of disclosure by the defendant, 
in the context of establishing such facts, could risk compromising the achievement of the 
objective pursued by that directive and thus depriving that provision in particular of its 
effectiveness.51  
Furthermore, in Accept, the CJEU ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation may be refuted with evidence, including a reaction by the defendant 
distancing itself from public statements on which the appearance of discrimination is based 
                                                
45 Barocas & Selbst, p. 692. 
46 Zarsky, supra note 11, p. 1389. 
47 Case C-54/07 Feryn ECLI:EU:C:2008:397, para 30. 
48 Advocate General, Case C-415/10 Galina Meister ECLI:EU:C:2012:217. Cf. Art. 16 EUCFR. 
49 Case C-54/07 Feryn ECLI:EU:C:2008:397, para 32. See Ellis and Watson, EU Anti-discrimination law, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 162-163. 
50 Case C-104/10 Kelly ECLI:EU:C:2011:506. 
51 Ibid, paras 34, 38. 
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and the existence of express provisions concerning its recruitment policy. However, it is 
unnecessary for a defendant to prove that persons of a particular sexual orientation have 
been recruited in the past, as this would interfere with their right to privacy.52 
These cases, where an individual assumes he has been discriminated against, show that there 
might be difficulties for individuals to get access to their ratings to (try to) prove the alleged 
discrimination, as this might touch upon the right to privacy of third parties involved, among 
which customers and co-workers. Nevertheless, in a case where a worker has been dismissed, 
in a number of EU Member States the employer will have to motivate its decision, unless the 
worker’s fixed-term contract automatically ends without being renewed. Collective 
agreements may specify the procedures for workers’ ratings, providing the necessary 
information based on which the worker can know what kind of information will be included 
in the employer’s decision-making. Moreover, data could be anonymised so that no personal 
data will be disclosed. 
3. Data protection challenges of customer ratings 
The system of customers’ ratings is currently implemented by almost every platform as a way 
to build trust within the community and preserve the attractiveness of the platform.53 How 
many people used to accept a ride from a stranger before the advent of the sharing economy 
and its rating mechanisms? The scoring system, usually in the form of the well-known 5-stars 
icon, has allowed the flourishing of new business activities, providing an additional source of 
information that traditionally was supplied by professionals through advertising or face-to-
face meetings. In principle, ratings may help to reduce the inherent information asymmetry 
within the parties, but in particular they can potentially promote the overall transparency 
over the transaction: they are third party reviews, reporting previous experiences with that 
buyer or provider of a service. In other words, rating systems have codified the word of 
mouth.54 Indeed, users can acquire a privileged amount of information that they would not 
be able to get from the counterparty, thus overcoming the difficulties, described by 
behavioural science55, related to informed choices.56 As Busch underlined: “Considering the 
limits of human attention, such consolidated ratings can help to mitigate the problem of 
information overload which could be caused by a large number of confusing and 
                                                
52 Case C-81/12 Asociaia Accept ECLI:EU:C:2013:275, paras. 57-58. 
53 Goldman, “The Regulation of Reputational Information”, in Szoka & Marcus (eds.), The next digital decade: essays 
on the future of the Internet, TechFreedom, 2010, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1754628; Busch, 
“Crowdsourcing Consumer Confidence: How to Regulate Online Rating and Review Systems in the Collaborative 
Economy”, in De Franceschi (ed.), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market, Intersentia, 2016, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799489; Thierer et al., “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and 
Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the 'Lemons Problem'”, 70 University of Miami Law Review 3, 2016, 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2610255; Botsman, Who can you trust? How technology brought us together and 
why it might drive us apart. Penguin, 2017; Hausemer et al., Exploratory study of consumer issues in online peer-to-peer 
platform markets. Final report, European Commission (EUR 2017.4058 EN), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45245. 
54 Dellarocas, “The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback 
Mechanisms” 49 Management Science 10, 2003, 1407–1424. 
55 Luth, Behavioural economics in consumer policy: the economic analysis of standard terms in consumer contracts revisited, 
Intersentia, 2010. 
56 Busch, supra note 53, p. 12; Stemler, “Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the Self-Regulation of the 
Sharing Economy”, 18 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2017, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754768 , p. 683. 
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contradictory reviews. The use of consolidated ratings thus takes into consideration the 
problems of bounded attention and bounded rationality and increases the salience (i.e. the 
cognitive accessibility) of the most important information”.57 
In addition, in many platforms – typically those of the sharing economy or supposedly so – 
users rate each other. Hence, scoring systems constitute an incentive for users to follow the 
rules of the community and to behave accordingly: participants are nudged to act in a way to 
keep the digital platform a safe and trustworthy place58. As Uber states: “Feedback is a two-
way street – important to ensuring a high quality experience for the leading internet-enabled 
platforms, marketplaces and online companies you love.  At Uber, riders rate their 
experience at the end of every trip, and drivers do the same. Uber regularly reviews that 
feedback and, through this process, we’re able to create and maintain a safe and respectful 
environment for riders and drivers in more than 200 cities around the world”.59 
The role of ratings is pivotal because it can influence the choices not only of the users-
potential-buyers but of the platform as well. Therefore, it can produce significant 
consequences on the weakest subjects, such as the providers of the service (e.g. the Uber 
driver). Indeed, bad scores and comments given the users of the platform may severely affect 
the digital reputation of the worker and, as a consequence, his/her activity: customers could 
decide not to accept a service from someone with a low score or, in the worst scenario, 
workers could be excluded from the platform. For example, if Uber’s drivers have an average 
score under the threshold of 4.6, their account can be deactivated, which basically means that 
their contract with the platform is terminated unilaterally.60  
Hence, despite their potential benefits and the promise towards more transparency, ratings 
mechanisms are far from being a perfect instrument to assess the quality of a performance: 
customers may complain fraudulently just to get a refund or a discount or they may give an 
inaccurate score because of a mistake or a personal bias.61 Such a problem, which inherently 
depends on personal behaviours, is not counterbalanced by a mechanism to “review the 
reviews”. 
In our view, the problem with scores is twofold and largely depends on how the platform 
designs the system.62 First, such ratings are highly subjective, but the score expressed in stars 
(from 1 to 5) give a false sense of objectivity. In other words, it turns a qualitative opinion 
about an overall experience into a quantitative one, generating a problem of 
oversimplification or, worst, inaccuracy. Furthermore, because of how the system is built, 
customers are not often aware of the difference between the score, for example, of 4 or 5 
stars. It is true that, in some platforms as Uber, customers are also allowed to leave a 
                                                
57 Busch, supra note 53, p. 12. By “consolidated ratings”, the Author refers to the score resulting from the 
aggregation of different reviews given by the customers and expressed in “stars” or other kinds of indicators. 
58 Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels, “Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation 
Information”, 59 Management Science, 2013, 265-285. Stemler, supra note 56, p. 683-684. 
59 https://www.uber.com/newsroom/feedback-is-a-2-way-street. 
60 California Labor Commission, Uber Technologies v. Berwick, 2015, available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1988&context=historical . 
61 Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, and Hwang, supra note 5, p. 8 ff. 
62 For an overview of different types of rating systems, see Pettersen, “Rating mechanisms among participants in 
sharing economy platforms”, 22 First Monday 12, 2017, available at 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7908/6586 . 
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comment, where he/she can offer details about the reason of the score. However, as 
previously mentioned, to get 4 instead of 5 stars can really make a difference for an Uber’s 
driver.  
Secondly, as shown by Dambrine et al., some platforms in the sharing economy do not 
facilitate the access to the reputation scores nor provide efficient means to challenge the 
accuracy of the reviews nor, in some cases, allow the erasure of bad comments and scores.63 
This is also the case of Uber, which – on the basis of information available – does not 
provide any ability to challenge or respond to ratings.64 Indeed, the Drivers Privacy 
Statement currently in force does not offer many details on how to handle bad evaluations: it 
vaguely states that drivers can “request access to, correction of, or a copy of [their] 
information by contacting Uber at help.uber.com or visiting our Privacy Policy Help 
Page”.65 However, the help page does not provide any insight about ratings issues and the 
direct request to the company does not seem to be particularly successful.66 
Such a situation of opaqueness is likely to conflict with data protection rules67. For instance, 
scores and reviews given by customers and referring to platform workers can be qualified as 
“personal data”, as they are a typology of information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual.68 Furthermore, as the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party (hereinafter 
“WP29”) has affirmed, the concept of personal data can include not only “objective” 
information but also “subjective” information, like opinions or assessments.69 Therefore, 
ratings may fall under this notion. As a result, the processing of this information should be 
guided by the data protection fundamental principles (lawfulness, purpose limitation, data 
minimisation, notice and consent, etc.) and data subjects shall be entitled to exercise their 
rights, in particular the rights of access, to rectification and to erasure. With specific 
reference to the processing in the context of employment, the GDPR leaves a certain 
amount of discretionary power to the Member States that can provide for more specific rules 
(Art 88.1, GDPR). In any case, such rules “shall include suitable and specific measures to 
safeguard the data subject's human dignity, legitimate interests and fundamental rights, with 
particular regard to the transparency of processing, the transfer of personal data within a 
group of undertakings, or a group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity and 
monitoring systems at the work place” (Art 88.2, GDPR).  
In the light of the limitations often enforced by platforms through technological and 
contractual means, we have identified three main points of frictions with the GDPR. 
                                                
63 Dambrine et al., “User Reputation: Building Trust and Addressing Privacy Issues in the Sharing Economy”, 
June 2015, available at https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF_SharingEconomySurvey_06_08_15.pdf , p. 9 
ff. 
64 Ibid., p. 11. 
65 https://privacy.uber.com/policy/. 
66 See here for example: https://uberpeople.net/threads/can-you-dispute-ratings.74676/ . 
67 For the purpose of this analysis we will take into consideration the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) (L 
119/1), which will be applicable on May 2018. 
68 See now Article 4(1), GDPR. 
69 WP29, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP136, 20 June 2007, p. 6. 
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1) Consent. Informed consent has always been one of the backbones of the European data 
protection framework and its role has been further emphasised in the GDPR. According to 
Art. 4(11) GDPR, consent must be: a) freely given; b) specific; c) informed; and d) 
unambiguous. In other words, it has to be a “clear affirmative act”70 and therefore the 
platform shall implement only opt-in mechanisms (e.g. no pre-ticked boxes or implicit 
consent). A preliminary problem deals with the highly questionable obtainment of the 
consent when the worker accepts the Terms of Service and privacy policy of the platform: is 
this consent actually freely given as required by 7(4), GDPR?71 In its Opinion on consent, 
the WP29 affirmed that “freely given” means that the data subject (the worker, in our case) 
has to be able to “exercise a real choice” and that “there is no risk of deception, intimidation, 
coercion or significant negative consequences if he/she does not consent”.72 As an example 
of controversial situation, the WP29 refers precisely the employment relationship, where the 
data subject is under the influence of the data controller (the employer) and he/she is not in 
the position of refusing the processing especially if it is a condition for the employment.73 In 
the context at stake, the consent is unlikely to be freely given: platforms’ workers have to 
accept the rating system if they want to offer their services through the platform and 
therefore they are obliged to consent to the dissemination of their personal data (scores) 
which will be accessible to any user of the platform. However, platforms may invoke another 
legal ground rather than consent, such as the legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR).74  
2) Right to access, rectification, object and erasure. This quartet of principles is designed to give the 
data subject the necessary legal tools to control his/her information flow. In this sense, the 
right of access is a precondition for the others: only if the data subject is aware of what data 
are processed, by whom and how, he/she can successfully pursue his/her other rights 
guaranteed under the GDPR75. For the purpose of this analysis, some provisions of Art. 15 
GDPR results to be particularly interesting. In fact, the data subject is entitled to receive 
from the data controller the following information: 1) the existence of the right to request 
from the controller rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing of 
personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; 2) where the 
personal data are not collected from the data subject (which will be the case of rating 
assigned by customers), any available information as to their source; 3) the existence of 
automated decision-making, including profiling, and, at least in those cases, meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject.  
First of all, as several studies indicate, the ability to access is often poorly implemented in the 
                                                
70 Recital 32 GDPR. 
71 According to Art. 7(4), GDPR “when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken 
of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent 
to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract”. 
72 WP29, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, WP187, 13 July 2011, p. 12. See now, WP29, Guidelines on 
Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (WP259), 28 November 2017. 
73 WP29, Opinion 8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context (WP48), 13 September 
2001. See now, WP29, Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work (WP249), 8 June 2017, p. 6-7. 
74 On the concept of legitimate interest, see WP29, Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data 
controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP217), 9 April 2014. 
75 Ausloos & Dewitte, “Shattering One-Way Mirrors. Data Subject Access Rights in Practice”, in International 
Data Privacy Law (Forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106632 . 
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online environment and filing an access requests may be result in a task far from being 
trivial.76 In addition, as already noticed, there are no well-developed tools that allow an 
effective and timely rectification of inaccurate data (see Art. 16, GDPR) nor their 
cancellation (Art. 17 GDPR)77.  
Secondly, the data controller shall communicate to the data subject the source of 
information: however, ratings given by customers are usually anonymised and the worker of 
the platform is therefore unable to defend himself from the author of the bad review. 
Indeed, the right of access may be limited if it can affect the rights and liberties of other 
individuals (recital 63 GDPR), such as for example the right to privacy of other co-workers 
or users of the platforms (i.e., ratings are also data referring to the customer who gave 
them).78 Furthermore, the scope of application of the right to access is limited to data 
subjects’ personal data: this means that the right cannot be exercised in order to get access, 
for example, to information (such as ratings and evaluations) related to the “colleagues”.79 
This could constitute a serious impediment if the worker wants to discover and demonstrate 
whether he/she was subject to any discriminatory behaviour by platforms or by other users. 
Finally, the GDPR has introduced a specific provision which aims at fostering transparency 
and some authors have welcomed this innovation as the “right of explanation” of the 
algorithm logic.80 This leads us to the third point of friction with the GDPR. 
3) The right not to be subject to automated individual decision making. The new Art. 22 expressly 
recognises that the data subject has the right to not be subject to a decision which is basely 
only on an automated processing of his/her data, such as profiling. Furthermore, the data 
subject shall receive “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing” (Art. 14(2)(g) and Art. 
15(1)(h) GDPR). This means that any kind of profiling directed to measure data subject’s 
performance at work (and that can result in his/her exclusion from the platform) cannot be 
based only on the aggregation of different scores given by customers without the possibility 
of any human intervention.81 The data subject in particular shall have the right to receive 
“specific information […] express his/her own point of view, to obtain an explanation of the 
decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision” (recital 71 GDPR). 
However, reading a contrario such provisions, if the processing is semi-automated – or not 
                                                
76 Ibidem.  
77 Dambrine et al., supra note 63. 
78 See, for instance, the previous paragraph. 
79 As affirmed by the Italian Data Protection Authority, who denied the possibility of some employees of a local 
health unit, which were involved in a procedure for the economic recognition of personal productivity, to get 
access to note di qualifica (“assessment of performance”) and evaluations related to other concurrent employees. 
See, Italian Data Protection Authority, decision of 6 February 2001, available at: 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/39236 [Italian only]. 
80 Goodman & Flaxmax, “European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a ‘right to 
explanation’’’, 38 AI Magazine 3, 2016; Selbst & Powles, “Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation”, 
7 International Data Privacy Law 4, 2017, p. 233-242, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3039125. Contra, 
Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, “Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist 
in the General Data Protection Regulation”, International Data Privacy Law, 2017, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2903469.  
81 Even if we agree that the automated decision is necessary for entering into a contract between the data subject 
and the data controller, the latter shall implement suitable measure to protect the data subject’s right, “at least, the 
right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to 
contest the decision” (Art. 22(3) GDPR). 
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automated at all - the data subject cannot enjoy such rights. Hence, if the platform 
demonstrates that the exclusion of a user from the system is partially based on customers 
ratings but the final decision is taken by a person (e.g. from HR), the worker could only rely 
on Art. 16, GDPR and the problems already mentioned. However, in its recent guidelines on 
automated individual decision making and profiling, the WP29 has clarified that: “the 
controller cannot avoid the Art. 22 provisions by fabricating human involvement. For 
example, if someone routinely applies automatically generated profiles to individuals without 
any actual influence on the result, this would still be a decision based solely on automated 
processing. To qualify as human intervention, the controller must ensure that any oversight 
of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture. It should be carried out by 
someone who has the authority and competence to change the decision. As part of the 
analysis, they should consider all the available input and output data”.82 It is worth noting 
that the mentioned “token gesture” is usually what happens in most of the cases related to 
the gig-economy, where the worker is excluded from the platform if his/her ratings tragically 
falls under a predetermined threshold. 
4. Obstacles and pathways 
As we stated in our Introduction, we argue that an analogy can be drawn between the 
decision of the CJEU in Bougnaoui, notably the part concerning customer preferences, and 
the use of customer ratings in employment-related decisions. However, it should be noted 
that in Bougnaoui the Court of Justice only denied that customer preferences could represent a 
genuine occupational requirement.83 This is only relevant if a direct discrimination is alleged.84 
Similarly, as we saw before, pandering to (alleged) customers’ preferences could not excuse a 
direct discrimination, as it was the case in Feryn. It is by no means clear that such a reasoning 
would be extended in a case of indirect discrimination. Indeed, an indirect discrimination 
only needs to be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, while the means of achieving that 
aim should be appropriate and necessary85. This warrants a particularly cautious approach to 
the applicability of this case law to the phenomenon here at stake. 
Considering that the appearance of neutrality is a characteristic of the “scored society”86, it is 
indeed likely that judges might assess the situation as one of indirect discrimination. As 
stated by Morozov: “Here we run into the perennial problem of algorithms: their presumed 
objectivity and quite real lack of transparency”.87 A prima facie case of indirect discrimination 
needs to be demonstrated through significant statistical data showing the adverse impact of 
the measure on persons characterised by one of the protected grounds. However, the ability 
of the individual worker to have access to data related to customer ratings runs against 
important obstacles, as these rating are related to other workers, and as such are beyond the 
scope of data to which he or she can demand access. Furthermore, to provide a meaningful 
comparison, and hence statistical proof of discrimination, the worker would need to receive 
                                                
82 WP29, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (WP251), 
3 October 2017, p. 10. 
83 Bougnaoui, para. 40-41. 
84 Directive 2000/43/EC, Art. 4 ; Directive 2000/78/EC, Art. 4 ; Directive 2006/54/EC, Art. 14(2). 
85 Directive 2000/43/EC, Art. 2(b) ; Directive 2000/78/EC, Art. 2(b) ; Directive 2006/54/EC, Art. 2(b). 
86 Pasquale, supra note 13, p. 35. 
87 Morozov, To save everything click here, Allen Lane, 2013, p. 248. 
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data related to ratings of individuals characterised by the same protected criterion, hence 
covering an information which the employer might not be entitled to collect in first place88.  
If such an obstacle can indeed be overcome, and a prima facie case of indirect discrimination is 
hence established, it is arguable that the employer would not be able to hide behind the black 
box of customer ratings to justify its decision. This would in fact make it impossible the 
application of non-discrimination law by mere obfuscation, something which has been ruled 
out by the Court of Justice in Danfoss89. The question would then turn in one of justification.  
The precedents of Bougnaoui and Achbita90 have shown that the Court is willing to accept 
employers’ organisational choices as legitimate aims, on the basis of the freedom to conduct 
a business enshrined in Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In these cases, 
the Court has found the wish of the employer to “project an image of neutrality towards the 
customers” to be a legitimate objective. Thus, as highlighted by Vickers, the fact of 
responding to customers’ preferences, which could not be used to justify a direct 
discrimination, was instead deemed a legitimate objective in the context of an indirect one.91 
Furthermore, the Court did not in any way consider whether the choice in favour of such an 
image was in any way necessary for the business at stake.  
One can only wonder whether a similar fate would await the choice of using customer 
ratings for assessing the performance of workers. After all, Uber stresses the importance of 
customer ratings to keep “a top tier service for riders”.92 The wish to project a certain image 
seems sufficiently broad a concept to be employed also in this context, as an “image of 
neutrality” is not per se distinguishable from any other image an employer might be willing 
to project -apart from those which might be explicitly illegal. An “image of neutrality” does 
not appear to be more legally protected than, for instance, an image of punctuality, 
cleanliness, friendliness and so forth, all of which could justify the decision to use customer 
ratings to assess workers’ performances.  
The fact that customer ratings are only used to assess customer-facing workers might also 
fulfil the requirement of proportionality, if one follows the reasoning of the Court in Achbita, 
where it stated: “ […] what must be ascertained is whether the prohibition on the visible 
wearing of any sign or clothing capable of being associated with a religious faith or a political 
or philosophical belief covers only G4S workers who interact with customers. If that is the 
case, the prohibition must be considered strictly necessary for the purpose of achieving the 
aim pursued”.93 Moreover, the distributed nature of some services prone to use customer 
                                                
88 Ellis and Watson, supra note 49, p. 155; Zarsky, supra note 11, p. 1403 
89 CJEU, C-109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, agissant pour 
Danfoss, ECLI:EU:C:1989:383, para. 13: “[…] in a situation where a system of individual pay supplements which 
is completely lacking in transparency is at issue, female employees can establish differences only so far as average 
pay is concerned. They would be deprived of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay before 
the national courts if the effect of adducing such evidence was not to impose upon the employer the burden of 
proving that his practice in the matter of wages is not in fact discriminatory”. See also CJEU, C-318/86, 
Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:1988:352, para. 26-27. 
90 Case C-157/15, Achbita, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. 
91 Vickers, Achbita and Bougnaoui: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back for Religious Diversity in the 
Workplace (2017), 8 European Labour Law Journal 3, 1-27, p. 20. 
92 Uber’s Welcome Packet (“What Uber looks for”), quoted in Uber BV, Uber London Limited and Uber Britannia v 
Aslam & Others, UKEAT/0056/17/DA. 
93 Achbita, para. 42. 
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ratings (from the gig-economy to call centres) might also suggest that using this form of 
control is indeed necessary for maintaining a control over the quality of the service provided, 
and hence to ensure the desire image of the company.  
Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas and Solon, analysing this issue in the context of US law, conclude 
that non-discrimination law is ill equipped to fight discriminatory practices grounded in 
customer ratings94. Our conclusion in the context of EU non-discrimination law is presently 
similar. Even if sufficient data to prove an indirect discrimination can be presented, we argue 
that an employer, following the reasoning of the CJEU in Achbita and Bougnaoui, would be 
able to justify the use of customers’ ratings on the basis of their equal application to all 
workers, their importance for the image of the company and their application only to 
customer-facing workers. This would be more likely the case in the case of work on-demand 
via mobile applications, for instance, where an Uber driver has been demanded to drive a 
customer. In the end, EU non-discrimination law would prove more useful to protect against 
the single employer holding discriminatory views (or pandering to the same views from a 
specific customer) than against widespread prejudices among customers. We wish to stress 
that this conclusion is based on a limited number of precedents, so that it is still a possibility 
that new decisions by the CJEU might go in a different direction. 
That being said, we argue that, in light of the obstacles for ex-post remedies, which seem 
difficult to overcome without sacrificing the privacy of other workers, ex ante solutions 
should be explored to preserve the effectiveness of non-discrimination. The insidiousness of 
the alternative has been highlighted by AG Sharpston in her Opinion in the Bougnaoui case, 
when she the pointed out that accepting “the argument, ‘but we need to do X because 
otherwise our customers won’t like it’ […] [w]here the customer’s attitude may itself be 
indicative of prejudice based on one of the ‘prohibited factors’” would be akin to excusing 
“the employer from compliance with an equal treatment requirement in order to pander to 
that prejudice”.95  
The data protection framework could offer a set of rights and remedies which may ensure in 
principle a fairer balance of interests of all the subjects involved in the processing, but they 
cannot eliminate the risk of discrimination perpetrated by the platform via its customers 
ratings.96 Indeed, as affirmed by the European Data Protection Authority during the 
Computer, Privacy and Data Protection Conference, held in Brussels in January 2018: “Data 
protection tools alone will not create a better world. We need to go beyond mere 
compliance”.97 
Keeping this exhortation in mind, we present a proposal that aims to reduce the risk of 
discrimination and enhance the transparency, through a more effective IT implementation of 
data protection principles. The main problem, as we have seen, is that the battering-ram able 
to demonstrate a discrimination, the right of access, is often limited by its very nature (data 
subjects can access only their personal data) or by the other competing rights and freedoms. 
In the light of the principles of data protection by design and data protection by default, now 
                                                
94 See Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, and Hwang, supra note 5, p. 14. 
95 Opinion of AG Sharpstone in Bougnaoui, para. 133. 
96 As pointed out by Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, and Hwang: “Through a rating system, consumers can directly 
assert their preferences and biases in ways that companies would be prohibited from doing directly”. Ibid., p. 10. 
97 Buttarelli, Closing speech at the Computer, Privacy and Data Protection Conference, Brussels, 25 January 2018. 
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expressly codified at Art. 25 GDPR, we propose a solution to burst the “rating bubble”, by 
keeping the privacy of all the subjects and, at the same time, ensuring the effective exercise 
of the rights recognised under the GDPR. It is a proposal that presuppose the collaboration 
of the platform: the latter should design the system in order to provide the relevant 
information to the data subject without disclosing the identity of the customer who left a bad 
review. First of all, if customers are not satisfied with the service and leave a bad review, they 
should not be able to save the score without – at least, succinctly - explain the reasons of the 
complaint. Secondly, if the worker wants to have access to his/her data, he/she has to be 
entitled to see the consolidated score in a disaggregated form, in order to identify the bad 
reviews. Since the latter should be annotated with a short comment from the customer, the 
worker should be able to address them and explain his/her point of view. In addition, 
he/she shall always be entitled to ask how the consolidated rating has been calculated. 
Therefore, he/she could ask for the rectification or the erasure of the score from his/her 
consolidated rating. While this verification is pending, the platform will have to recognise the 
worker his/her right to the restriction of the processing (Art. 18 GDPR), in order that the 
bad score will not affect his/her consolidated rating until the issue is clarified. 
Source for the icons: Pixabay. CC0 License 
 
In any case, the platform should not be entitled to terminate the contract with the worker 
without giving to him/her the possibility to challenge the bad score. In addition, if the 
platform still takes a serious decision against the worker, the latter should be able to have 
access to the de-identified scores of the “colleagues” in order to challenge the platform’s 
decision. 
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A further alternative might be found in systems of auditing for scoring algorithms98, which 
could be transposed in the context of customer ratings. Citron and Pasquale notably propose 
that scoring systems should be subject to licensing and audit requirements when they enter 
critical settings like employment, insurance, and health care. 99 Transposing this in the 
context of the phenomenon here at stake, employers would have to disclose data related to 
ratings to independent auditors/independent agencies. These independents actors would 
then be able to assess the potential biases of the ratings themselves, as well as of the resulting 
decisions100, and hence their suitability as a ground on which to base employers’ choices. To 
provide an incentive to allow for the auditing to take place101, one might imagine a shift of 
the burden of proof for those employers basing their decisions on an un-audited rating 
system. A similar “stick” could also be used to underpin our previous proposal dealing with 
access to ratings. Alternatively, to preserve the effectiveness of non-discrimination law, 
legislators should take steps to ensure that customer ratings are treated as an intrinsically 
insufficient ground for employment-related decisions. As such, these decisions should also be 
based on grounds other than that customer ratings. 
                                                
98 Sandvig, Hamilton, Karahalios & Langbort, “Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting 
Discrimination on Internet Platforms”, The 64th Annual Meeting of the International Communication 
Association, 2014; Pasquale, supra note 13, p. 150-151. 
99 Citron and Pasquale, supra note 8, p. 21-22. 
100 Including, for automated decisions, the way in which algorithms using customer ratings are designed. 
101 See Zarsky, supra note 11, p. 1388. 
